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a P[arent?
By Dorothy R. Fait,
Jillian L. DiLaura, and
Michelle M. Botek
n the second half of the 20th
century, structural changes
emerged in the American family.
Currently, an estimated 2.9 million
children in the United States do not
live with either biological parent. As
others perform the practical and psy-
chological functions of a parent, the
"parent" can no longer be identified
by the traditional legal definitions.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized a
fundamental liberty interest to parent,
as guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment. However, the era of the
"postmodern family" has blossomed,
muddying the conventional criteria
for parenthood. State legislatures have
responded by enacting statutes
allowing third parties to seek visita-
tion, and in some cases, custody
of children.
In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000), the Supreme Court examined a
case involving grandparents (Troxels)
seeking visitation with their grand-
children, following the death of their
son (the biological father). The Troxels
petitioned under the Washington
statute, which did not require a
prefatory showing of changed circum-
stances, after the children's mother
(Granville) reduced visitation with the
grandparents. The trial court granted
visitation to the grandparents based
on a "best interests of the child"
standard. Granville appealed. The
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U.S. Supreme Court found that the
Washington statute was unconstitu-
tional, as it was overly broad and
exceeded the bounds of the 14th
Amendment's due process
protections.
Under Troxel, presumptively fit
parents should not have the burden of
disproving visitation as not in the
child's best interests and are entitled
to certain protections of their liberty
interests. The Court expressly
declined to address whether the Due
Process clause requires a showing of
harm to the children as a prerequisite
to visitation, thereby implicitly
endorsing visitation statutes which
are well-considered and adequately
take into account parental liberty
interests.
In the recent Maryland case, Koshko
v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, (2007), the
Maryland Court of Appeals revisited
third party custody cases, specifically
those filed under Maryland's
Grandparent Visitation Statute
("GVS"). Koshko involved the Haining
grandparents seeking visitation with
their grandchildren. The Circuit Court
held that the Hainings had successfully
rebutted the presumption that the
Koshkos were acting in the best
interests of the children by limiting
visitation. The court ordered visita-
tion. On appeal, the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals affirmed.
Although the Court of Appeals in
Koshko did not find the GVS was
unconstitutional, the Court's ruling
essentially gutted the statute, leaving
third party custody or visitation
claimants to negotiate an entirely new
playing field. Koshko relegated grand-
parents to third party standing in
custody and visitation cases, while
also eradicating any distinction
between the standards for "custody"
versus "visitation."
Despite the vast difference between
custody and visitation, under Koshko,
the same two-part test is used for third
parties in both instances (third party
first proves natural/biological parent
is unfit or exceptional circumstances
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exist before applying the best interests
analysis). Visitation is considered a
"species of custody" that may be a
lesser degree but still requires a strict
scrutiny standard application. Thus,
all third-party visitation cases require
the application of an initial threshold
test before reaching a best-interests
analysis.
Unfortunately, the ruling renders
the standard application unduly
burdensome for visitation claims.
While a third party might seek
custody when a biological parent is
unfit, it is not logical that in a parental
unfitness situation, the third party
would merely request visitation. By
default, the only available avenue a
third party seeking visitation can
pursue is that of "exceptional
circumstances."
The exact definition of "exceptional
circumstances" is provided solely
through case law. In McDermott v.
Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-5 (2005),
the Court ruled that in the absence of
parental unfitness, "extraordinary
circumstances that could result in
serious detriment if the child were to
remain in the custody of the parents"
must exist. A non-exhaustive list was
enumerated in Ross v. Hoffman,
28- Md. 172 (197), including (1) the
length of time the child has been away
from the biological parent; (2) the age
of the child when care was assumed
by the third party; (3) the possible
emotional effect on the child of a
change of custody; (4) the period of
time which elapsed before the parent
sought to reclaim the child; (5) the
nature and strength of the ties
between the child and the third party
custodian; (6) the intensity and gen-
uineness of the parent's desire to have
the child; and (7) the stability and cer-
tainty as to the child's future in the
custody of the parent. Other factors
have also been considered, including
the stability of the home environment,
the ongoing family unit, the child's
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physical, mental, and emotional
needs, the child's past relationship
with the putative father, or the child's
ability to ascertain genetic informa-
tion. Turner v. Wisted, 327 Md. 106
(1992).
These factors address situations
where the third party was already
essentially fulfilling the role of a
custodial parent or has (or had) actual
physical custody and is now seeking
legal verification of his or her status.
The exceptional circumstances factors
as set forth in Ross presuppose a
discrete set of circumstances that do
not fully cover all instances where
third party visitation might be appro-
priate. Specifically, the "exceptional
circumstances" test as it currently
stands does not account for any
type of parent by estoppel or de
facto argument.
The term "de facto parent" literally
means "parent in fact" and is used to
describe a party who claims custody
or visitation rights based upon the
party's relationship with a non-bio-
logical, non-adopted child. Janice M.,
infra. The American Law Institute
defines de facto parents as "an
individual other than a legal parent or
a parent by estoppel who, for a signif-
icant period of time not less than two
years, (1) lived with the child; (2) for
reasons primarily other than financial
compensation, and with the agree-
ment of a legal parent to form a
parent-child relationship, or as a result
of a complete failure or inability of
any legal parent to perform caretaking
functions (a) regularly performed a
majority of the caretaking functions
for the parent; or (b) regularly
performed a share of caretaking
functions at least as great as that of the
parent with whom the child primarily
lived. American Law Institute, Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations §
2.03(1)(c) at 107-108, (2003).
Maryland law frequently cites a test
set out by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Holtzman v. Knott (In re
H.S.H-K), 193 Wis. 2d 649 (Wis. 1995)
and the New Jersey Supreme Court in
V.C. v. M.J.B., 163N.J. 200 (N.J. 2000).
Under this test, de facto parents are
found by four elements: (1) that the
biological or adoptive parent consent-
ed to, and fostered, the petitioner's
formation and establishment of a par-
ent-like relationship with the child; (2)
that the petitioner and the child lived
together in the same household; (3)
that the petitioner assumed the obliga-
tions of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the
child's care, education and develop-
ment, including contributing toward
the child's support, without expecta-
tion of financial compensation; and (4)
that the petitioner has been in a
parental role for a length of time suffi-
cient to have established with the
child a bonded, dependent relation-
ship parental in nature." The person
claiming to be a de facto parent bears
the burdens of pleading, production
of evidence, and persuasion.
Despite this test, however,
Maryland courts have not recognized
the de facto parent as a legal status in
Maryland. According to the Court of
Appeals, "short-circuiting the require-
ment to show unfitness or exceptional
circumstances is contrary to Maryland
jurisprudence, as articulated in
McDermott and Koshko.'" Janice
M., infra.
The Court of Appeals recently
decided Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404
Md. 661 (2008), which involved a
custody dispute stemming from same-
sex partners. The couple was together
for approximately eighteen years,
during which time Janice M. adopted
a child. The parties raised the child
together, sharing caretaking duties,
for approximately five years before
they separated. The Circuit Court
relied on the case S.F v. M.D., 132 Md.
App. 99 (2000), which held that if a
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party can meet the test enunciated in
Holtzman, he or she is a de facto parent
and although still a third party for
purposes of custody and visitation, is
not required to show unfitness or
exceptional circumstances when the
right to visitation is at issue.
In Janice M. however, the Court of
Appeals overturned the S.F decision,
based in part on the Koshko holding
that visitation and custody require the
same level of scrutiny, and in part on
the determination that Maryland law
will not recognize a de facto parent
status. The Court opined that even if it
did recognize de facto parenthood,
there is not sufficient reason to find
that a de facto parent should be
treated differently from other third
parties. According to the Court,
"where visitation or custody is sought
over the objection of the parent, before
the best interest of the child test comes
into play, the de facto parent must
establish that the legal parent is
either unfit or that exceptional
circumstances exist."
A de facto parent is distinguished
from another third party by one
significant factor: the biological or
adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's parent-like
relationship with the child. The
current law allows the biological/
adoptive parent to unilaterally change
her mind, waive her "fundamental
rights" banner and shield herself
behind it, dictating the terms of all
contact between the minor child and
the de facto parent, who had been
acting as the child's second parent.
Once a de facto parent has been created,
it can be argued that the biological
parent has forfeited his or her right to
claim a "fundamental right" to parent.
A de facto parent's standing,
however, does not abrogate a natural
parent's fundamental right to parent
when considering the role of the
natural parent in the creation of the
de facto parent role. A parent's
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constitutional right ceases to be
fundamental when the natural parent
fosters the parental bond with the
third party, deliberately and
consciously creating and encouraging
a relationship between the third party
and the child. To then allow that
parent to renege on that promise and
relegate the other party, who had in
fact been functioning in all conceiv-
able capacities as a full parent for a
significant length of time, to just a
third party is unfair to the de facto
parent and not in the best interests of
the child.
An interesting conundrum occurs
in the case of the "parent by estoppel,"
where one parent, typically the father,
believes he is the biological parent due
to certain affirmative actions of the
mother. In Janice M., the Court of
Appeals noted that parenthood by
estoppel prevents one legal parent
from denying a party visitation or
custody rights where the legal parent
previously has taken affirmative steps
or actions to treat that party as the
actual parent of his or her child. The
Court of Appeals had examined this
circumstance in Monroe v. Monroe, 329
Md. 758 (1993).
There a mother informed a man
that he was the father of her unborn
child. The man subsequently married
the mother and went on to raise the
child as if she were his own. The Court
found that given the relationship
between the minor child and the
father, as well as the other significant
factors, exceptional circumstances
existed to warrant the rebuttal of the
best interest presumption. Despite
being a technical third party, the Court
has found that the parent by estoppel
argument can be sufficient evidence
of an exceptional circumstance to
warrant overcoming the natural
parent presumption.
In theory, the concept of a parent by
estoppel is no different from that of a
de facto parent. Particularly, both rely
on the actions of the "natural" parent,
either through representations that the
other party is actually a biological
parent or that the other party is a
co-parent and an equal member of the
family. The articulated distinction
between these two fact patterns turns
on what the third party actually
believes. In Janice M., Margaret K.
argued that de facto parenthood
status is a subset of exceptional circum-
stances, citing Monroe as precedent.
However, the Court distinguished
the two cases by looking at the totality
of the circumstances giving rise to the
exceptional circumstances in Monroe.
According to the Court in Janice M., it
was not just the psychological bond
between the child and the father that
led to exceptional circumstances but
the fact that the putative father
believed he was the biological father
from the time of the child's birth, the
mother's representations, the father's
actions, and the presence of a separa-
tion agreement outlining joint custody
of the child. However, when
comparing the two cases, the only dif-
ferences appear to be Margaret K.'s
knowledge that she was not (and
could not be) the biological parent and
the existence of a separation agree-
ment (although we note that Margaret
K. did have a consistent visitation
schedule that was being exercised
post-separation).
Although the Court has been
extremely careful to specify that the
mere presence of a parent by estoppel
is not sufficient to warrant a finding of
"exceptional circumstances" on its
own, the key difference hinges on the
third party's belief and knowledge
about the genetic status of the child. In
focusing solely on this component, the
Court overlooks the bond between the
child and the third party, the
substance of the Hoffman factors, and
the role of the biological parent in
fostering the relationship. In both
instances, the biological or adoptive
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parent bears the brunt of the responsi-
bility, either for misrepresenting the
circumstances of the conception or
through creating and encouraging the
relationship between the child and the
third party. However, it is the third
party who suffers as a result of the
parent's actions, and ultimately the
child who bears the greatest loss.
There is a place here for equitable
estoppel principles to apply.
Moreover, Maryland law has allowed
for equitable estoppel in other domes-
tic cases. In Ashley v. Mattingly, 176
Md. App. 38, 62 (2007), the Court
instructed that before ordering genetic
testing, the trial court must first
consider whether such testing would
be in the best interests of the child. The
Court also recognized that the State
has a vital "interest in ensuring [that]
children born of a marriage do not suf-
fer financially or psychologically
merely because of a parent's belated
and self-serving concern of a child's
biological origins." Id. at 63.
In Dep't of Human Resources, Garret
County Dep't of Social Services, Bureau of
Support Enforcement, ex rel. Duckworth
v. Kamp, 180 Md. App. 166 (2008), the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals
followed the Ashley ruling and found
that not only was genetic testing
improper, but that subsequent termi-
nation of child support, in certain
cases, based on non-paternity
was prohibited.
In Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 538-39
(1986), the Court again considered an
equitable estoppel claim in a child
support case, citing a three part test:
(1) the party claiming the benefit of
the estoppel was misled to his injury
and (2) changed his position for the
worse; (3) having believed and relied
on the representations of the party
sought to be estopped. In other words,
in that case, they opined, significantly,
that even though the non-biological
father knew the minor child was not
his, he treated him as his son and as a
member of their family.
According to the Court, "such
conduct is consistent with this State's
public policy of strengthening the
family, the basic unit of civilized
society. We encourage spouses to
undertake, where feasible, the
support, guidance, and rearing of
their spouses' children, so long as
such conduct does not deprive the
children of their right to support from
their natural parents."
Certainly in the case of a de facto
parent, there is a complete abrogation
of the public policy of strengthening
the family. Assuming that the non-
parent was functioning as an equal,
that person contributed to the minor
child in a myriad of ways. The
non-parent suffers a detriment
through the unceremonious stripping
of rights by the natural parent.
Moreover, the child suffers a
detrimental loss of the second parent.
Equitable estoppel arguments are
entertained in child support cases,
based on the theory that a child has a
right to rely on a certain amount of
financial support and security. Yet the
emotional stability and relationship
with the non-parent is accorded less
significance under the law. Essentially,
we have created a system whereby a
non-parent may be estopped from
having visitation or seeking custody
of a child, despite prior roles or exist-
ing relationships, but who may still be
obligated to pay child support.
Maryland law also permits adop-
tion by estoppel. In Geramifar v.
Geramifar, 113 Md. App. 495 (1997), the
Court of Special Appeals upheld the
doctrine of equitable adoption, where-
equitable principles, may accord to
the child the status of a formally
adopted child for certain limited
purposes. In Geramifar, the Court
considered a case where a presump-
tive adoptive father attempted to
terminate his obligations to the child,
based on the fact that the American
adoption had not yet been formalized.
The Court of Special Appeals found
that the father equitably adopted the
child and it was in the child's best
interests for the adoptive father to
contribute to his support.
The Courts of Maryland find that
equitable doctrines apply to some
family law instances, but not others.
Perhaps the concept of parent by
estoppel can be broadened to include
parties formerly thought of as "de
facto parents." Allowing for these
parties' rights, especially with regard
to visitation, will not undermine the
fundamental right to parent
established through Troxel and its
progeny. Nor will it open the door to
unqualified grandparent visitation
claims, such as the Koshko case. Rather,
it will hold the biological or adoptive
parent responsible for his or her
decision to invite another parent into
the life of the child.
The natural parent should not be
permitted to use the "fundamental
right to parent" as a shield once the
"de facto parent" relationship is no
longer convenient. In certain cases, the
best interests of the child can only
be protected through the legal
acceptance of the de facto parent or
the parent by estoppel. &
Ms. Fait, Ms. DiLaura, and Ms. Botek
practice family law at Fait, Wise & DiLima,
LLP in Rockville, Maryland. They may be
reached at dfait@faitwisedilima.com,
jdilaura@faitwisedilima.com, or
mbotek@faitwisedilima.com.
there must be voluntary conduct
(representation), reliance, and
detriment. Although the Court did not
find that sufficient deprivation existed
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by an individual contracts to adopt a
child and partially performs on the
contract but falls short of completing
the adoption. A court, applying
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